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COST ANALYSIS OF U.S. NAVY HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE 






In the wake of rising costs and limited budgets, the U.S. Navy has been challenged to 
perform its missions while pursuing opportunities to reduce operating costs. One of those 
missions that has expanded recently is Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief 
(HA/DR). In 2007, the Navy officially added Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster 
Relief as a core competency to its maritime strategy. From 1970 to 2000, the Navy 
diverted vessels 366 times for HA/DR operations, as opposed to 22 times for combat 
operations. With the ever-expanding role of the U.S. Navy in HA/DR operations, it is 
important to study how the Navy can perform its missions while saving costs. This report 
serves to provide Navy leadership with policy recommendations that will improve 
HA/DR mission capabiility while saving costs at the same time.  
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On December 27, 2004, I was a helicopter pilot stationed on board the U.S.S 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN. The carrier battle group had jU.S.t pulled out of Hong Kong for 
a port visit and we were supposed to be heading north in order to patrol the waters off the 
Korean shores. Instead, we were heading south. Then Rear Admiral Douglas Crowder, 
the Battle Group Commander, made the decision to head toward the area where a tsunami 
had struck just the day before. I had heard vague descriptions of the disaster, but just days 
later, we were in position to help the stricken survivors. Over the course of the next 
month, I delivered over 100,000 pounds of food, water, and medical supplies, provided 
valuable reconnaissance information from my position in the air, and rescued 93 
survivors from their plight. It was the most rewarding mission of my life and helped sway 
my decision to stay in the Navy years later.  
In 2012, I had a discussion about HA/DR with a colleague who is a Surface 
Warfare Officer, who had quite a different experience on board a guided missile 
destroyer the Navy sent in response to the earthquake in Pakistan. The Navy had diverted 
his ship approximately 1200 miles in order to respond to the crisis and when the ship 
arrived, it was only able to offer minimal support. While they could act as a refueling 
station for helicopters operating in the area, the ship could not provide any direct support 
to the devastated area as they did not have a helicopter stationed onboard. My friend was 
extremely frustrated as they had been performing an important mission before responding 
to the earthquake and believed that his ship was actually a hindrance to the relief effort 
because his ship was clogging the area without being able to provide support.  
Ever since I had that conversation with my friend, I had always felt empathy for 
his situation. Now that I’ve been studying finance at the Naval Postgraduate School, I 
have a new perspective on his circumstances: what a waste of taxpayer dollars! It was 
with this thought in mind that inspired me to write this report.  
I would like to thank the Visibility and Management of Operating and Support 
Costs Center for their help in providing such valuable data to complete this project. I 
  xvi
would also like to thank Professors Aruna Apte and Keenan Yoho for their guidance and 





In December 2004, a Tsunami devastated hundreds of miles of the Sumatran 
coastline. Because the Tsunami was sudden in onset and dispersed across a large 
geographic area (Apte, 2009), the Indonesian infrastructure had a difficult time providing 
basic supplies to the ruined villages (Ures, 2011). At the time, the U.S.S ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN Carrier Strike Group was just leaving a port-call in Hong Kong when news 
arrived of the calamity. The commander made the decision to move his ships towards the 
destruction instead of going north to patrol the North Korean coastline, and proceeded to 
demonstrate the U.S. Navy’s unique and valuable capabilities in the wake of disasters 
with its highly successful response to this crisis.  
Since that disaster, the U.S. Navy has successfully responded to the 2010 Haiti 
earthquake and the 2011earthquake in Tohoku, Japan, but there was very little thought 
about the financial implications of each operation. Given the high visibility of these types 
of missions, “send everything and we’ll figure out how to pay for it later” is a forgivable 
strategy. While the Navy has done much to improve its ability to respond to disasters, it 
has done very little to consider costs in its mission. Instead, the Navy has sent practically 
every available asset at its disposal. This project will provide information to Navy 
leadership about what assets should be sent in response to these types of crises in order to 
provide the most capability and minimize costs at the same time.  
This project will analyze the costs associated with those three major operations in 
order to provide senior leaders with information of what the best options are in future 
disasters. The project specifically attempts to determine a “capability score” for every 
platform the U.S. Navy and the Military Sealift Command sent during each of those 
crises. The report will then derive data from the Navy Visibility and Management of 
Operating and Support Costs website to determine the actual costs of sending each ship to 
respond to the three disasters and compare those costs to the capability score.  
2Graphical representation of the comparison can lead to further analysis and show 
which ships are the most cost effective for a given level of HA/DR response capability. 
The goal of this project is to offer Navy leadership an analytical framework and set of 
policy recommendations that show which ships are likely to provide the most capability 
during a HA/DR operation at the lowest possible cost. 
B. SUMMARY OF METHODOLOGY 
Using the Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs Database, 
which contains historical reports of the actual costs to operate every ship in the U.S. 
Navy and the Military Sealift Command annual costs were gathered for every ship sent in 
relief for three different operations: Indonesia in 2005, Haiti in 2010, and Japan in 2011. I 
divided those costs by 365 in order to determine a daily operating cost for each ship. I 
then separated the ships by type and normalized the costs to fiscal year 2015 dollars using 
the appropriate inflation index in order to establish a daily operating cost by ship type.  
The next step was to determine a capability score for each ship. Based on 
Greenfield and Ingram (2011); Kaczur, Aurelio, and Joloya (2012); Apte, Yoho, 
Greenfield, and Ingram (2013); and my own expertize in the subject matter I assigned a 
point system for each of the following capabilities:  
• Helicopters aboard,
• Aircraft support,
• Landing craft support,








• Personnel transfer, 
• Freshwater production, 
• Personnel support, 
• Berthing capacity, 
• Medical support, 
• Transit speed, 
• Hydrographic survey, 
• Salvage operations, and 
• Towing. 
 
After assigning a value to the categories, a “total capability score” for each ship 
type was determined. I then compared the score to the daily operating cost of that ship to 
yield a dollar value for every point of capability the ship provides. The results of that 
dollar value demonstrate which ships the Navy should send in the wake of a crisis in 
order to maximize capability and minimize costs.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. THE RISE OF THE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE DISASTER RELIEF 
MISSION 
The U.S. Navy has dramatically increased its focus. on the Humanitarian 
Assistance and Disaster Relief over the last few decades. From 1970 to 2000, the Navy 
diverted 366 times for HA/DR operations (Thomas, 2003). These operations, however, 
were typically limited actions involving one or two ships, not the substantial movement 
of material and ships the world has come to expect (Sea Power for a New Era, 2009). The 
response to Indonesian Tsunami that occurred on December 26, 2004, was enormous. 
(Elleman, 2007). Within just ten days of the disaster, the U.S. Navy had 25 ships 
operating on-scene along with 58 helicopters and had already delivered over 610,000 
pounds of food, water, and medical supplies (Elleman, 2007). The U.S. Navy was able to 
make a direct impact in helping the people of Sumatra, but this operation also had the 
indirect impact of enhancing diplomatic relations between the United States and 
Indonesia, which had an Islamic majority.  
The Terror Free Tomorrow poll in February saw significant increases in 
Indonesian favorable public opinion towards the U.S. as a result of the U.S.’s HA/DR 
efforts (Terror Free Tomorrow, 2005). Further, over 75% of Indonesians believed at the 
time that the U.S. was “doing enough” to aid tsunami victims (Terror Free Tomorrow, 
2005). Operating closely with the Indonesian military and government during the HA/DR 
response helped bring the two countries together, which was important to U.S. foreign 
policy. The United States also promptly lifted a previously imposed military supplies 
embargo against Indonesia and by May 2005, President Bush discussed resuming 
“normal military relations” (Elleman, 2007). The humanitarian aid the United States 
provided began to even improve relationships with other countries besides Indonesia. In 
the summer of 2006, then Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter declared, “[The United 
States has] seen significantly positive impacts in Indonesia, Pakistan and Horn of Africa 
as a direct result of our and other nations’ humanitarian assistance and disaster relief 
(Elleman, 2007, p. 37).  
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Senior civilian and military leadership began to see the sizeable benefits of the 
HA/DR mission. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a prominent 
public policy think tank, established a bi-partisan commission to examine the potential 
for applications of smart power in 2006 (Albon, 2009). Co-chaired by policy experts 
Joseph Nye and Richard Armitage, the commission determined that the military would 
play a larger role in soft power execution, especially in the role of HA/DR (Albon, 2009). 
The commission specifically brought up the HA/DR mission in Indonesia as an example 
of how military assets could be Used to great effect for U.S. foreign policy goals (Albon, 
2009).  
By 2007, the U.S. Navy sensed a shift and set a new course for naval forces. 
While the nation focused their attention on protracted land engagements in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, Naval leadership, along with Coast Guard and Marine Corps participation, 
created a new strategy called the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (Allen, 
Conway, & Roughhead, 2007). The Cooperative Strategy (CS21) stressed the national 
security importance of having a flexible, responsive, and persistent naval surface force 
capability and included Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster relief into the Sea 
Services’ core competencies (Allen et al., 2007). CS21 further highlighted the need for 
the naval services to practice a blend of “hard” and “soft” power. The hard power of the 
Sea Services was the capability to project power ashore and to control the sea, while the 
soft power was proactively engaging with international partners and potential partners to 
gain influence with a nation’s leadership as well as positively shaping public perceptions 
of the United States (Allen, Conway, & Roughhead, 2007). This clear shift in strategy 
drew praise from numerous foreign policy experts. Gordon Lubold contended that Navy 
goodwill missions could become the Navy’s essential tool in combating terrorism 
(Lubold, 2007). The Washington Post openly praised the new strategy upon its release 
(Tyson, 2007). Robert Kaplan of The Atlantic wrote an article entitled “America’s 
Elegant Decline,” in which he argued that only through an active and globally present 
Navy could the United States secure its great power status. (Kaplan, 2007) . He further 
stated that the concept of “hulls in the water” would be far more important in the 21st 
century than “boots on the ground” (Kaplan, 2007). Kaplan firmly believed in the CS21 
  7
plan and considered the HA/DR mission as one of the key areas of engagement 
performed by the United States Navy.  
In the years since CS21, the Department of Defense has incorporated HA/DR into 
its strategic documents. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 2010 performed by 
the Department of Defense discussed humanitarian assistance and disaster relief multiple 
times: four times in discussing building international relationships, once in regards to 
U.S. interagency cooperation, and once when discussing potential impacts of climate 
change (Defense, 2010). By 2011, HA/DR even became a core capability of the entire 
U.S. military as it was included in the National Military Strategy (NMS). The NMS had 
an entire section dedicated to the mission entitled “Theater Security Cooperation and 
Humanitarian Assistance.”  
 Additionally, the U.S. Navy has incorporated the HA/DR mission into its overall 
recruiting campaign. Since 2010, the U.S. Navy has declared itself “A Global Force for 
Good,” in a multitude of commercials and on its recruiting website (Navy, 2014). One 
commercial showed scenes of ships, aircraft and Sailors in a flooded area conducting 
search and rescue. Another showed Aircrewmen handing out supplies to children 
overlooking a devastated area. On the recruiting website, the Navy further explains what 
constitutes a “Global Force for Good” by saying that, “[the Navy is] a force that readily 
answers the need for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief anywhere, anytime – to 
help American citizens and citizens of the world” (Navy, 2014). 
The Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster relief mission has without a doubt 
become a significant function of the United States Navy. As such, in an era of limited 
budgets, this mission should be further researched as to how the Navy can improve its 
capabilities regarding this new mission area while also considering costs at the same 
time.  
B. HELICOPTERS: THE ESSENTIAL ASSET  
When the Tsunami hit Sumatra in 2005, over 100 miles of coastline was 
devastated (Elleman, 2007). The coastal road was also useless, cutting off supplies by 
land to all the villages along the coast (Elleman, 2007). The only method in which the 
distraught people could quickly receive essential supplies was through the helicopter 
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(Elleman, 2007). Admiral Thomas Fargo, Commander of PACOM, stated that “helicopter 
vertical lift was vital to the success of the U.S. Navy’s humanitarian mission in 
Indonesia” (Elleman, 2007, p. 48). Further, then Secretary of State and former Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell declared on January 5th that in Indonesia, 
“helicopters are invaluable, especially helicopters coming in from the sea, where they can 
be refueled and resupplied out on our carriers, and are not taking up space at airfields or 
putting a logistics base at airfields” (Gray, 2005). The Provincial Governor of Indonesia 
also considerably praised the helicopters, proclaiming that they “appeared like angels out 
of the sky” (U.S. Efforts Aid in Tsunami Relief, 2005).  
Navy helicopters have the ability to fly over any terrain up 13,000 feet and 
provide assistance practically anywhere (NATOPS, 2007). Furthermore, if the terrain is 
too rough to land, the helicopter still has the ability to provide assistance by hovering low 
over the ground and dropping off needed supplies from the cargo hold. These assets also 
have a very low footprint where they can deliver the needed supplies and leave without 
the worry of offending the local population by staying. This became an issue in Sumatra 
in 2005 when the U.S.S. BONHOMME RICHARD wished to provide relief through its 
amphibious assault ships (Elleman, 2007). Bruce Elleman, in his thorough account of the 
Indonesian relief, describes the scene as such:  
 
Positioned off the city of Meulaboh, where only several thousand residents 
had survived out of an original population of sixty thousand, this ship had 
landing craft ready to put about a thousand Marines ashore. This 
movement was delayed, however, because it might appear to be an 
invasion. Aceh Province had been under the control of the Indonesian 
military, and it was thought that televised images of U.S. landing craft 
heading for the Acehnese coast “could touch a raw nerve with the proud 
and suspicious Indonesian military.” Finally, on 10 January 2005, a U.S. 
Navy LCAC—air-cushion landing craft—went ashore with thirty pallets 
of food and water. Only a few dozen personnel on Bonhomme Richard 
were allowed to go ashore each day. Also, instead of driving vehicles 
themselves to deliver aid—and risking traffic accidents that might spark 
anti-American anger, as had happened in places like South Korea—the 
Marines left final distribution of the supplies mainly to the Indonesian 
military. (Elleman, 2007, p. 80)  
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Aircrewmen using a helicopter can easily absolve them of political and cultural 
sensitivities by providing the necessary supplies and flying back to their home ship. 
Helicopters were truly essential to delivering supplies in Indonesia, as they were the only 
asset capable of doing so. 
The situation in Indonesia with the devastated infrastructure is not unique for a 
HA/DR mission. Indeed, it is one element that is common in all of the HA/DR missions 
the Navy has performed since the Tsunami relief in Indonesia. Since then, the U.S. Navy 
has performed a HA/DR mission in eleven more devastated areas.  
In 2005, Hurricane Katrina ripped through the Gulf Coast of the United States. 
Sustained winds of over 140 mph wrought havoc on the coastline and its catastrophic 
aftermath included flooding and devastated infrastructure (Hurricane Katrina, 2005). 
Even in the most industrialized nation in the world, the helicopter was crucial in 
providing need assets to stranded survivors.  
Later that year, an earthquake rocked Pakistan with a massive 7.6 magnitude, 
leaving hundreds of thousands dead and millions without homes (Thompson, 2005). The 
Navy, in an effort to provide the most support possible, sent helicopters from Bahrain to 
provide support as it was the most important asset needed (Thompson, 2005). Lieutenant 
Commander Todd Vandegrift, Officer-in-Charge of HSC-26, said that his squadron 
would provide “flight relief, support, water, food, and shelter to distant portions of 
Pakistan [in order to go to the] parts most affected by the earthquake” (Thompson, 2005). 
He further went on to say that “this allows the United States and the U.S. Navy to support 
an important ally and lend support to those in need” (Thompson, 2005).  
In February of 2006, a mudslide devastated three villages in the Philippines. The 
U.S. Navy was quick to respond and within days, the U.S.S Essex the U.S.S Harpers 
Ferry, and the U.S.S Curtis Wilbur were on scene to provide support (Truax, 2006) . That 
support was able to be provided because there were numerous. Helicopters stationed on 
board those ships that could deliver the needed assistance. They helicopters in that 
situation were able to provide essential relief supplies, perform a reconnaissance of the 
area, and drop off personnel able to help dig (Truax, 2006).  
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Hurricane Felix swept through much of Nicaragua in late 2007. Luckily, two U.S. 
Navy ships were nearby and could provide support because they had helicopters stationed 
onboard. The helicopters played a “major” role in the first week of the disaster mission, 
airlifting more than 125,000 pounds of relief supplies and medically evacuating 34 
people during the initial frantic days after the storm (Wimbish, 2007). The relief mission 
commander stated that it was “It was our privilege to provide help to the Nicaraguan 
people in the aftermath of Hurricane Felix” (Wimbish, 2007). He further went on to say 
that it was a “demonstration of the close linkages among the people of the Americas 
coming to aid a partner nation,” highlighting the strategic value a well-performed HA/DR 
mission can provide to the United States (Wimbish, 2007) . 
In another disaster relief mission, the U.S.S KEARSARGE arrived off the coast 
of Bangladesh to provide assistance in the wake of a Tropical Storm (Hossain, 2007). The 
United States was not well-loved by this country at the time, and demonstrators even 
chanted in their capital “Go back! We don’t want their warships!” (Hossain, 2007). The 
ship had twenty helicopters aboard and it was able to provide much-needed assistance 
solely because of these assets. Admiral Timothy Keating said that “we are here to help 
people in their time of need” (Hossain, 2007). This action helped improve relations with 
Bangladesh overall and demonstrated once again the value of the helicopter in a time of 
disaster.  
The Philippines again faced natural disasters in 2008 and in 2009 when Tropical 
Storms hit the island nation. Within days of each disaster, a Carrier battle group had 
arrived on scene and provide much needed supplies (Fuentes, 2008) According to the 
U.S. Embassy, the carrier group “[supported] immediate rescue, recovery and disaster-
relief efforts being carried out by Philippine authorities” (Fuentes, 2008). They were able 
to do this because they had helicopters, as they could not provide support any other way.  
In every instance that the U.S. Navy provided relief in HA/DR missions, the 
helicopter was the essential asset. When determining how much capability a ship has in 
providing support for a disaster, one mU.S.t first look at how many helicopters the ship 
can bring, if any at all. While some ships can provide different types of support, this 
premier asset should be regarded as the highest priority.   
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III. DATA/METHODOLOGY 
Data collection proved to be the most important and difficult part of this project. 
Attempting to locate the actual operating costs of the multitude of ships sent in relief 
proved to be very difficult. However, the articles by Greenfield and Ingram (2011); Ures 
(2011); Kaczur, Aurelio, and Joloya (2012); Herbert, Wharton, and Prosser (2012); and 
Apte, Yoho, Greenfield, and Ingram (2013) were beneficial in providing the background 
for organization of the data. 
The Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs Center were 
essential to my research. The center maintains a database of every type/model/series in 
the Navy in order to provide cost estimators or Congress with historical data (VAMOSC, 
2014). The historical data is the most important tool a cost estimator has to predict future 
costs. With a query, one could generate a report of a specific ship that had the total 
annual operating cost, including such variables as fuel costs and manpower, in any given 
year. Once I realized the database could generate such a specific report, I looked at what 
ships were sent during each of the three crises.  
A. AVERAGE DAILY COST 
The EM-DAT database contains specific data as to which ships the Navy sent in 
response to each crisis (EM-DAT, 2014). After compiling that list, one can go back to the 
VAMOSC database to request a report for those ships during the year that they responded 
to the disasters. Upon receiving the reports, I Used the ship inflation index in order to 
convert that dollar amount into a comparable number using 2015 dollars as a standard. 
The three tables, Tables 1, 2, and 3, describe the average daily cost of operations for each 
ship deployed or diverted for each of the three disasters: Indian Ocean Tsunami 2005, 























Table 2. Haiti Earthquake Response 2010 
 
Table 3. Tohoku Disaster Response 2011 
 
  14
The Navy sent a lot of different types of ships to respond to each disaster. Table 4 
summarizes the results by describing the average daily cost by ship type across the 
disasters. These costs play a significant role in the financial analysis generated in this 
report.  
Table 4. Average Daily Cost by Ship Type in 2015 U.S. Dollars 
 
B. CAPABILITY 
Greenfield and Ingram (2011) analyzed capabilities of both U.S.N and MSC 
vessels by platform. The authors broke down the capability by “little to none,” “some,” 
and “very capable” and depicted their findings using a visual symbol method. The 
findings of Greenfield and Ingram are given in Appendix A, B, and C. Based on their 
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research, Table 5 assigns a point system to each of the mission areas they identified and 
includes a new category for helicopters stationed aboard.  
Table 5. Capability Score by Platform 
 
 
The report above is a conglomeration of information gathered from each 
shipboard operational manual, located on the Navy Sea Systems Command website 
(Navy Sea Systems Command Manuals, 2014). As discussed in the literature review, the 
helicopter and the vertical lift capability it provides is an essential asset, the U.S. the 
assignment of a twenty point value for every helicopter stationed aboard each platform. I 
arrived at the number by averaging the approximate time the supplies could have been 
delivered had helicopters not been utilized in the three disasters. Using that methodology, 
the grade of 20 points is generous. Conservative scoring as it does not take into account 
political sensitivities or even whether or not the supplies could even be delivered by 
another method.  
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C. CAPABILITY SCORE VERSUS DAILY COST 
The motivation for this report is to offer policy recommendations and a financial 
analysis of HA/DR operational costs and to provide an understanding of which platforms 
provide the most “bang for the buck.” Table 6 describes cost per aggregated capability, 
which is calculated by comparing capability to the daily cost. 
Table 6. Cost (U.S. Dollars) per Capability 
 
 
The results are arranged in the ascending order 
of the total capability per U.S. dollar spent. 
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
A. CAPABILITY ANALYSIS 
Were the U.S. Navy not concerned at all with costs and just wanted to provide as 
much capability as possible, Table 7 depicts the most capable ships:  
Table 7. Total Capability for each Ship 
 
 









Figure 1.  Capability Scores by Ship Type 
With even the most cursory of glances at this chart, one can see that the true 
workhorses for the U.S. Navy in any Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief 
Mission are going to be the LHD, LHA, CVN, and LPD platforms. Further, one can also 
see that any platform to the right of the T-AFS provides little to no HA/DR capability at 
all.  
Comparison of cost in U.S. dollars for each ship with its total capability score 
offers some insight into the effects of sending an LHD versus a DDG Flight One when 








Figure 2.  Cost vs. Capability 
B. CAVEATS 
The methodology used in this study is rudimentary and does not take into account 
some unusual circumstances which may be considered in future disasters. A large 
earthquake may entirely change the underwater topography of the area. This situation 
would strongly increase the value in sending a Hydrographic Survey Ship (T-AGS) to 
investigate the area. Many ships could have been disabled and require the use of Tug 
boats. Another instance might be that hospital beds are essential and circumstances may 
be such that a Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) cannot be established on the 
ground. In this case, the value of a Hospital Ship my rise tremendously. In the case of 
Indonesia, President Bush sent the slow-moving hospital ship U.S.S MERCY to relieve 
the U.S.S ABRAHAM LINCOLN. While the ship did not have nearly the capability as 
the aircraft carrier, sending the ship held great symbolic value as far as demonstrating 
  20
support for the relief effort to the Indonesian people and the rest of the world. The U.S.S 
MERCY then began to help Indonesians with their regular medical needs and between 
February and June of 2005 treated over 9,500 patients (Elleman, 2007). Furthermore, 
some supply ships do not have a helicopter stationed onboard but they might be essential 
for the rest of the ships to continue further operations. Another aspect to consider is the 
defense of the ships providing support. Some DDG’s that do not have helicopters on 
board may be essential in providing close-in defense of the Battle Group. Those 
decisions, however, rest with the Combatant Commander; the purpose of this report is 
merely to provide that commander with information which could help in providing 
capability for a disaster relief.  
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this report is to offer Navy leadership a tool which they could use 
to determine which ships to send in the wake of a natural disaster. As the HA/DR has 
become a core competency during a time of limited budgets, it is important to consider 
cost effective methods of performing this mission. In the past, the U.S. Navy has 
sometimes sent many types of ships without due regard to their HA/DR capability. This 
is understandable, as most ships are designed to perform a variety of missions. This 
project studied what capabilities would contribute most to the HA/DR mission and 
determined that the helicopter is the most important asset many Navy ships have at their 
disposal during a disaster. After assigning a score to the various HA/DR capabilities with 
special consideration of the significance of the helicopter, one could determine a total 
capability score for each type of ship in the Navy. This report then studied the actual 
operating costs of every ship involved in three major disasters and determined which 
ships were the most cost effective. 
The results clearly showed that the LHD, LHA, and the LPD were by far the most 
cost effective ships to send in the wake of a disaster. The report also showed that ship 
types such as the HSV, T-AO, T-AK, and a DDG without a helicopter aboard provided 
little HA/DR capability and were not cost effective. In future disasters, Navy leaders may 
look at Figures 8 and 9 to help them determine which ships to send to the area.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY 
While realizing that it is sometimes difficult to break up the battle order of a 
Carrier Strike Group, Navy Leadership should take the HA/DR capability into account 
before diverting assets into a disaster area.  
HA/DR stakeholders within the U.S. Navy should study the previous missions to 
ascertain which ships could have been cut from the response without causing any 
detriment to the overall response capability. One could use the tables established in this 
report as a baseline to determine an ideal solution from each of the disasters. This 
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research could further be expanded by adding up the operating costs of the ships to 
demonstrate how much the U.S. Navy could have saved had it sent a more appropriate 
response.  
Future force planners within the U.S. Navy should take into account the HA/DR 
mission as it chooses the most suitable platforms for the future. New aircraft such as 
drones may be valuable assets in the HA/DR mission. Providing a model for how many 
may be required may assist future planners in their estimates for the number the U.S. 
Navy should acquire.  
As the U.S. Navy has incorporated HA/DR into its core competencies, further 
research could be done on the viability of future exercises having the mission as its 
primary purpose. Examination of the benefits of such an exercise could be worthwhile to 
explore. Further, one may consider having an expert in HA/DR on each of the Combatant 
Commanders’ staffs. Research could be done on that what that person’s background and 
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APPENDIX B. U.S.N PLATFORM CAPABILITIES 
 
(Source: Greenfield and Ingram, 2011) 
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APPENDIX C. MSC PLATFORM CAPABILITIES 
(Source: Greenfield and Ingram, 2011) 
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